In 2012, the Philippine media
suddenly diverted its attention from domestic news to the encounter between the
Chinese ships and the Philippine navy vessel in the Scarborough Shoal. All of a
sudden, the dispute on territorial boundaries was revived along with various
competing sentiments both of the Filipinos and Chinese people. But, with China
being a common denominator of several border disputes particularly in the South
China Sea, it has been inevitable to look at China as an aggressor and a threat
in international security. As a growing economic power, it is therefore a
challenge for China to maintain its global image and at the same time, protect
its national interest either by means of peaceful negotiations or by the use of
threat and force. Consequently, this leads us to question why China behaves
this way. The force behind all of these strong claims of China must have been
deep inasmuch as this fuels a giant and increasingly growing influence in the
international realm.
Hence, the objective of this paper
is to examine if and how Chinese nationalism shape China’s foreign policy
particularly regarding territorial claims and how does this affect China’s
relationship with the international community. This paper is divided into three
sections. The first part traces the development of Chinese nationalism along
with its implications in China’s foreign policy from Culturalism to Positive
Nationalism. The second portion talks about Chinese nationalism on the
strategies behind territorial disputes by examining China’s relationship with Japan,
the ASEAN (for the South China Sea), the Philippines and the United States.
Lastly, the author concludes by assessing the prospects for China’s foreign
policy and the fate of Chinese nationalism.
I.
The
Development of Chinese Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy
Nationalism may be defined in
different contexts. For the Filipinos, for example, nationalism may refer to “devotion
to or advocacy
of national unity” [1].
Other countries such as Japan and South Korea once defined nationalism in
commercial terms. However, in China, it has been an evolving concept from the
middle kingdom myth to the modern type of nationalism focusing on national
interest.
Chinese
Culturalism
For two millennium, the
foreign relations of China had been fastened on the principle of Culturalism
which emphasized the distinction between ‘Us’ (China or Huaxia) and the ‘Others’(barbarians or Yidi). [2] It
was the general acceptance of their culture, Confucianism, that made this
distinction. The Chinese people did not recognize any other ethnicity but
theirs which means that they saw themselves as the only civilized people in the
world. They regarded their culture as the highest among others; hence, lived in
the belief of superiority over the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, the Chinese relationship
with the barbarians was based on Sino-Centric universalism (Tianzia zhuyi)[3].
According to this view, the world is in a hierarchical order, with China as the
center of the universe or the ‘middle kingdom’[4].
The Chinese emperor was regarded as the Son of heaven. He rewarded those
barbarians who made a political submission to him. [5]
This submission was highly demeaning on the part of the ‘barbarians’ that they
had to do the kowtow diplomacy or the
kneeling and bowing so low before the emperor a number of times. With these,
the early Chinese therefore believed that the international realm was bounded
by a fixed world order and not by relationships between states. This tradition
of patron-client relationship (the act of submission in exchange for
incentives), later on, is found evident in Chinese foreign relations until the
present times.
However, this long-reigning cultural
superiority of the Chinese was shaken, and later on collapsed as Western
invasions followed by Japanese occupation to China proved its invalidity.[6]
With the defeat of the Qing empire and proceeded by the threat to the Chinese
culture, the claimed ‘middle kingdom’ realized for the very first time that
their supremacy was not real externally. Thus, to save China from this great
humiliation, the Chinese scholars formulated the idea of nationalism.
The
Emergence of Nationalism
Some scholars like Callahan and
Fitzgerald (and later proved by Gries et.al) argue the humiliation that the
Chinese experienced formed the Chinese nationalism[7].Contrary
to Culturalism which only shaped the mindset of the Chinese people, nationalism
was a force to suppress external incursion. China promised to reclaim its lost
territories that were removed from the Chinese empire as soon as it regained
its strength. [8]
If in traditional culturalism the
Chinese people were not rebellious against the ‘barbarians’ because they were
superior, nationalism made them look the other way around. In the first half of
the 20th century, “as China struggled against major invasions from
Russia and Japan, nationalism was a flag under which the nation could rally in
collective hatred of the enemy”.[9]
Different types of Chinese
nationalism emerged through time which greatly shaped China’s foreign policy.
These were state nationalism, ethnic nationalism, nationalism-internationalism,
and modern positive nationalism.
State
Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism
Two strands of nationalism affected
the way the Chinese people redeemed themselves in the 20th century.
State nationalism of Liang Qichao was the combination of culturalism and
nationalism, directed towards the integration of the Chinese nations as one
China[10].
Ethnic nationalism by Sun Yat Sen, on the other hand, was more revolutionary
that he reduced the idea of Chinese nations to the Han Chinese.[11]
He called on the Han Chinese to ‘recover the state for our own nation . . .
[and] not allow other nations to take away our nation’s government’.[12]
The primary aim of this nationalism was to oust the Manchu rulers from its
ruling position.
This anti-imperialist nationalism
was also manifested in Koumintang’s time under the leadership of Chiang
Kai-Shek who also attempted to remove foreign influences. He was able to reduce
the extrajudicial rights enjoyed by the foreign powers in China except from the
Japanese who were still in Manchuria in 1931.[13]
But the resentment continued up to Mao Zedong’s time when he formulated the
anti-Japanese nationalism and declared war against Japan in April 1932.[14]
Nationalism-Internationalism
As China moved from the hatred of
the past, Chinese nationalism shifted from domestic expression towards a more
outward orientation. As led by Mao, nationalism was now combined with
internationalism (nationalism under internationalism) which means that by
liberating the Chinese people or leading them to emancipation, the imperialist
would be defeated.[15]
The imperialist here referred to the capitalists, chiefly the United States.
Hence, practicing nationalism in China was serving internationalism in the
service of the socialist world. [16]
Consequently, nationalism was now influencing CCPs foreign policy in the
international community as a whole. In this, we can see how the Cold War
changed the focus of China’s foreign policy; but, intrinsically, it was still
the remnant of their anger on the Western power. Also, this marked the
beginning of a more overt confrontation between China and the US that seems to
extend up to the present times. Nevertheless, this mixed
nationalism-internationalism approach to foreign policy took different forms as
China became at odds with the Soviet Union.
In the 1970s, China started to
experience national security threats as it became involved in border war with
the Soviet Union.[17]
Nationalism again altered and rose over internationalism to protect its
independence. With reference to Zhu Geliang’s ancient strategy, the proposed
foreign policy was to “ally with US in the East to resist the Soviet Union in
the North”.[18] Hence,
China was more into achieving relative gain over the Soviet Union, that it
sacrificed its long-held aversion to US just to overthrow its present major
enemy. Some of the first steps of China
were its membership in the United Nations in 1971 followed by the Sino-US
rapprochement in 1972.[19]
The
Modern Positive Nationalism
As China welcomed the 21st
century, the foundation of Chinese nationalism diverted from ideology to
national interest. The priority of the Chinese government nowadays is on
economic developments and improvement of its citizens’ living standards[20].
China’s approach to international relations changed from waging conflicts
against its enemy, to fostering independence and peace. This new kind of
nationalism is called positive nationalism[21].
Indeed, Mao’s approach to foreign
relations revealed China’s motivation behind its alliance with the
international community- basically, to protect its national interest. This
could also lead us to think that if Chinese nationalism today is to foster
peace and order in the international community, it might be because it protects
its interest in the said realm. As asserted by Storey, “to facilitate this goal
(economic modernization), China needs a peaceful regional environment in which
to pursue economic reform”. [22]
Knowing these, we can further analyze China’s relationship with other states to
see how modern nationalism works in its foreign relations.
II.
Chinese
Nationalism on the Strategies Behind Territorial Disputes
Ilona Raskolnikova in her article in
Pravda.Ru lists all the disputes China is still involved in. Accordingly, the
list include “Burma, Laos, Northern India, Vietnam, Nepal, Bhutan, Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, the Ryukyu Islands, 300 islands of the South China, East
China and Yellow Seas, as well as Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Taiwan, South
Kazakhstan, the Afghan province of Bahdashan, Transbaikalia and the Far East to
South Okhotsk” which according to Mao Zedong, were lost due to the fall of the
Qing empire.[23] If
Raskolnikova is correct, these are the long list of China’s targets in
regaining its claimed territory.
Despite its promotion of peace and
order, many see it as an aggressor as it is the common denominator of many
conflicts, as stated above. Nevertheless, there are some scholars who reject
this idea, asserting that China has always been loyal to its commitment on
peace and order. Lee Jung Nam proves this argument by surveying the perceptions
of the intellectuals (here, treated as the ones who influence Chinese
nationalism) and, afterwards, found out that the intellectuals perceive Chinese
nationalism as not a form of aggression, but only a reaction to certain social
and political phenomena. [24]Maxwell’s
analysis also comes up with a conclusion that China’s approach to the
international relations has always been ‘good’ and ‘exemplary’.[25]
As declared by Zhou Enlai in the Bandung Conference in 1955, China’s claim for
territories has always been based on history.[26]
Consequently, history shapes Chinese nationalism which is then a force behind
China’s foreign policy. The question, however, is how this claim is put into
action.
Generally, China uses cooperation
strategy. It involves compromising by dividing the disputed land or moderating
claims with the exclusion of threat or force[27].
Accordingly, China’s military response to India and USSR, in 1962 and 1969
respectively, was not a deviation from this strategy, but was largely based on
the actions of the said countries as they both used escalation strategy first (the
use of force).[28] The
Chinese military success over these events did not achieve international
understanding; instead, was seen as a threat or an aggression. This notion is
still prevalent nowadays. But how does China treat different states in
different cases?
The
Sino-Japanese Relationship
In terms of Sino-Japanese rivalry
especially on Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands, double-edged sword was used as a strategy-
the Janusian strategy. This means that China has to take into account both
China’s economic relations with Japan and its domestic stability as this
relation might be seen as anti-nationalist by the masses.[29]
Beukel examines four
crises between China and Japan. First is the 1990 crisis when it was reported
that Japan was preparing to recognize the lighthouse on the Senkaku Rocks as
theirs causing uprisings in China. However, controlled protests and a media
blackout were imposed. The second is the 1996 crisis when the Japanese Youth
Federation erected a second makeshift lighthouse on the said island. Third is
the 2004–5 crisis when two Chinese fishing vessels were attacked by Japanese
patrol boats stirring again anti-Japanese protests across China. Fourth is the
2010 crisis when a Chinese trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard ships clashed.
The Chinese responded by constricting trade with Japan and cancelling tourist
trips to Japan. [30] The undone dispute
between China and Japan regarding the Senkaku Chains demonstrates China’s
restraints on its diplomacy with Japan regarding the East China Sea dispute, and
likewise with Japan to China. We can also observe here that it was the Japanese
who instigated conflicts since the 1990s. This proves that China is not an
aggressor; but its reaction to the disputes was merely product of the
sentiments of the Chinese people (popular nationalism).
Nevertheless, in the 2000s, Chinese
leadership tries a new policy approach to Japan considering its growing
economic ties instead of nationalistic feelings without risking its state
sovereignty[31]. In
this perspective, the issue of the Senkaku Chains disputes would take a longer
time to settle since they, though historically rivals, could not enter into
much deeper conflict because they both see each other as an economic partner.
This reminds us of the Sino-US rapprochement in 1972 wherein the long rivalry
between China and US was compromised to secure China’s national interest from
the threat of the USSR. Yet, He asserts that both countries can only traverse a
beneficial direction if they abandon national myth-making (stories against each)
to weaken Chinese nationalism. [32]However,
based on the survey conducted by Lee Jung Nam, Chinese intellectuals believe
that it will be China who is going to win in the rivalry[33].
China,
the ASEAN, and the South China Sea Disputes
The “China Threat” reemerged in the
1990s due to its forceful actions in the Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands.[34]
To change its violent global image, China had to devise a way to revive its
neighbors’ trust. China took multilateral steps such as participation in
multilateral forums in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional
forum in 1994 wherein it became its dialogue partner.[35]
One of the policy it used was the “charm offensive” (1997) which is the
combination of diplomacy, economic and cultural schemes in both bilateral and,
often, multilateral level. [36]
Diplomatic diplomacy was seen in its closer participation in ASEAN as
demonstrated by its membership in the ASEAN+3, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation, its signing of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and the
frequent visit of Senior Chinese officials in some states. [37]
China’s economic initiatives, on the other hand, include continuous trade,
investments and supply of financial aids in the developing countries such as in
Southeast Asia, and the construction of major projects like the Northway
Railways in the Philippines. [38]
Finally, the cultural scheme was demonstrated in China’s high level of
educational and cultural exchanges with other states[39].
In July 2011, the ASEAN and China agreed
over guidelines for implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea. [40]
It moderated the diplomatic tensions in the said region. Nonetheless, it must
be noted that all of these are not diplomatic expediency but strategic
decisions. China is fostering good relationship with ASEAN to gather support
for its interest in the region; the other way around would happen if its goal
is not achieved. For instance, in 1999 and 2006, China delayed voting on Nauru
and Tuvalu’s UN membership because these two were recognizing Taiwan’s
sovereignty[41].
Thereby, the multilateral strategy of China is helping the supporters and
afflicting the oppositions. This reward and punish system of the Chinese can be
traced to the Sino-centric view, as discussed above, wherein the Chinese
emperor rewarded those who did political submissions to him.
Though the argument that war has
less likelihood to happen in the South China Sea region, we cannot deny the
fact that China can behave in a different way but as threatening as war. As a
major ally in ASEAN and a large source of aid in the region, China can revoke anytime
its support. The challenge now to the ASEAN is to what extent it can go against
China especially in the recent case of the Sino-Philippine dispute in the
Scarborough Shoal.
The
Sino-Philippine Relations
As said earlier, China got involved
in a dispute in the Mischief Reef which is also claimed by the Philippines. In
1995, dispute between the two states grew when the captain of the Philippine
vessel reported that his crew was detained for several days by Chinese troops
in Mischief Reef.[42]
Though the Philippines showed a few sign of military gestures, it could only
solve the dispute diplomatically given its military weakness. In august 1995,
the two countries finally agreed on a code of conduct, preventing similar
conducts in the future and increasing bilateral cooperation in the South China
Sea.[43]
However, from 1995 onwards China gradually expanded its presence in the South
China Sea. This shows that China has been applying dual strategy of
negotiations and occupations in the disputed area. Moreover, Storey argues that
this foreign policy of China is influenced by domestic political factors. [44]
Despite its peaceful negotiations with other states, there are still certain
core issues that the Chinese leadership cannot compromise, particularly when it
comes to sovereignty over the areas which the Chinese believe are historically
theirs. [45]
Furthermore, this event which
happened 18 years ago can be related to what happened last year in the
Scarborough Shoal. Despite negotiations, China has continued its exploitation
of the area until the Philippines asked for air surveillance on the area from
the United States. Of course, the Chinese government would never want US to
mediate in the discussion as it is recognizably its soft power rival in the
region. The United States, on the other hand, chose to remain neutral in the
dispute while trying to boost Philippine’s military system.[46]
This could be explained by the fact the China is still the largest creditor of
the United States.
Thus, as we observe, China’s foreign
policy has dual faces. While trying to satisfy the international community with
so-called ‘peaceful’ negotiations, it is also cunningly pursuing national
interest even though it would violate some agreements. Going back to Chinese
nationalism, China would never want, first and foremost, its sovereignty over
its territories to be interfered by any means. Hence, also, by any means, it
would make way to protect its independence (one integrated China). In a sense,
the Chinese foreign policy is deceiving.
Sino-US
Rivalry
As we have noticed in the previous
discussions, the United States has always played the role of a mediator. But,
this is something that the Chinese people do not want to see as much as
possible. In the century of humiliation, US was one of those countries who
meddled in Chinese domestic and foreign affairs, and was further heightened when
it supported the independence of Taiwan. In the redemption period, which this
paper argues to have continued until the present, China has been creeping over
US by gathering support in regions such as the Southeast Asia and the
neighboring countries in East Asia. Even without directly confronting the
superpower of US, by fostering regional influence (i.e. friendly relations with
ASEAN) and gaining support from the developing states, as it provide aids and
economic opportunities, China can promote its national interest. [47]
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that this diplomatic relations of China
with the international community is merely gathering support and not an attempt
to balance power. As Hughes asserts, China does not need an ally to rise as a
global power.[48]
This would lead us to think that by aiming relative gain over US, China still
seems to possess the mindset of the ‘middle kingdom’: an absolute gain that it
can still rise as a superpower and can get the submission of the ‘others’. However,
both Maxwell and Fravel warn that if US continues to intervene in the
consolidation of China or the disputes China is into, particularly the South
China Sea disputes, conflicts are highly expected to rise. [49]
III.
Conclusion:
Prospects on Chinese Nationalism and China’s Foreign Relations
Indeed, with the growing role of
China in the global economy, and its increasing influences over Asia, Chinese
nationalism is a crucial force that has to be keenly observed. It is also dangerous that it continues to
demonstrate its cunning assertiveness especially in the South China Sea despite
warnings from other states. With China’s deep devotion to its national
interest, it is not impossible that it might escalate its strategies to more
violent actions in their claimed territories especially now that it has been
gaining economic power globally. Weishi then suggests that nationalism must be
neutralized in China, along with its neighboring countries. [50]
By institutionalizing a community of nations in the Asia-Pacific, tensions
would be moderated and conflicts of interest would be eased. Nationalism then,
as a self-centered devotion, would be weakened and eventually withered away. [51]
Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous
discussions, a large chunk of Chinese nationalism was and is manipulated by the
leader of the CCP. Hence, Chinese nationalism is a top-down development. But, with
China being more open now to liberal ideas and and into debunking of
‘irrational untruths’ from the past[52],
the Chinese minds are also being liberated from this manipulation. Eventually,
China’s foreign policy would shift from the old self-interested nationalism, to
a more genuine relative nationalism- pursuing national interest while keeping a
genuine, peaceful participation in the international community.
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conflict in the East China Sea, an Introductory Study”. (Copenhagen: Danish
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Maxwell,
Neville. “Settlements and Disputes: China’s Approach to Territorial
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1. No. 36 (2006): 3873-3881.
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Shie,
Tamara Renee. “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific”. Asian Survey 47. No. 2 (2007): 307-326.
Storey, Ian James. “Creeping Assertiveness:
China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute” Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1999): 95-118.
Sun
Yatsen, “Minzu de, guomin de, shehui de guojia: zai Tokyo Minbao chuangkan
zhounian qingzhu dahui de yanshuo” (‘State of nation, citizen and society:
speech at anniversary celebrating assembly of Minbao in Tokyo, December 2,
1909’), in Sun Yatsen wenji, Vol. I:
22-23.
Weishi,
Yuan., “Nationalism in Transforming China”. Global
Asia Vol.2 No.1 (2007): 21-27.
Zhimin, Chen. “Nationalism, Internationalism
and Chinese Foreign Policy in Journal of Contemporary China”. Journal of Contemporary China 14(42)
(2005): 35-53.
[1] Teodoro Agoncillo, “The
Development of Filipino Nationalism” ( n.p.1965), p. 1
[2] Chen Zhimin, “Nationalism,
Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy in Journal of Contemporary China”.
Journal of Contemporary China 14(42) (2005):
36.
[3] Ibid., 37
[4] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 38
[7] Peter Hays Gries et.al.,
“Patriotism, Nationalism and China’s US Policy: Structures and Consequence of
Chinese National Identity”. The China Quarterly 205 (2011): 3.
[8] Neville Maxwell. “Settlements and
Disputes: China’s Approach to Territorial Issues”. Economic and Political Weekly vol. 1. No. 36 (2006): 3873.
[9] Yuan Weishi, “Nationalism in
Transforming China”, Global Asia Vol.2 No.1 (2007): 21.
[10] Zhimin, Nationalism, 39.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Sun Yatsen, ‘Minzu de, guomin de,
shehui de guojia: zai Tokyo Minbao chuangkan zhounian qingzhu dahui de
yanshuo’
[‘State of nation, citizen and society: speech at anniversary celebrating
assembly of Minbao in Tokyo,
December
2, 1909’], in Sun Yatsen wenji, Vol. I: 22-23.
[13] Zhimin, Nationalism, 40
[14] Ibid.
[15] Zhimin, Nationalism, 41
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., 45
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 46
[21] Ibid., 46-47
[22] Ian James Storey,. “Creeping
Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1999): 98.
[23]Ilona Raskolnikova, “China has
territorial claims to nearly 20 countries” (Pravda.Ru: 2012).
http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/17-07-2012/121658-china_territorial_claims-0/
[24] Jung Nam Lee, “The Revival of
Chinese Nationalism: Perspectives of Chinese Intellectuals”, Asian Perspective Vol.30 No. 4 (2006):
161.
[25] Maxwell, Settlements, 3875.
[26] Ibid, 3873
[27] Ibid, 3873-3874
[28] Ibid, 3874
[29] Erik Beukel, “Popular Nationalism
in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship: The conflict in the East China
Sea, an Introductory Study” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International
Studies, 2011): 4
[30] Ibid, 12-17
[31] Ibid, 18
[32] Yinan He, “History, Chinese
Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict”. Journal of Contemporary
China 16 (50) (2007): 24.
[33] Lee, Revival, 163
[34] Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese
Influence in the South Pacific: Beijing's “Island Fever””. Asian Survey 47. No. 2 (2007): 308.
[35] Ibid., 307
[36] Ibid. , 308
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Fravel, Maritime, 33
[41] Shie, Rising Influence, 318.
[42] Storey, Assertiveness, 97.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid., 95
[45] Ibid., 99
[46] Stuart, Grudgings, and Manuel
Mogato. “Philippines may ask for U.S. spy planes over S.China Sea”. Yahoo News.
(2012).
http://ph.news.yahoo.com/exclusive-philippines-may-ask-u-spy-planes-over-191235661.html
[47] Hughes, Christopher R.
“Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for
Southeast Asia”. The Pacific Review 18 (1) (2005): 125
[48] Ibd., 123.
[49] M.Taylor Fravel, “Maritime
Security in the South China Sea and the Competition Over Maritime Rights.
Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea (
January 2012): 47; Maxwell, Settlements, 3881.
[50] Weishi, Nationalism, 25.
[51] Ibid., 26.
[52] Ibid., 24
